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ABSTRACT 
Emotions are responses to goal attainments or blockages emerging in the course of 
daily social encounters. Emotional responses to being harmed by another were 
investigated in relation to cognitive appraisals, social factors and gender in 
participants from Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States of America. 
Participants in every cultural group experienced depressive emotions (sadness, fear, 
anxiety, and shame), hostile emotions (anger, irritation, and annoyance), or both 
kinds of emotions when they were harmed. Cognitive appraisals of norm violation, 
responsibility and controllability of the harm-doer, and negative justification 
predicted hostile emotions, while justification, norm violation, and relationship 
closeness with the harm-doer predicted depressive emotions. Structural equation 
analyses supported a culturally universal model of responses to being harmed, with 
cognitive appraisals, as a whole, mediating the relationship between perceived 
emotional harm and hostile emotions, but not that between perceived emotional harm 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“No man is an island entire of itself." (Donne, 1959). 
As social animals, human beings have strong inherent needs to form and 
maintain interpersonal bonds with one another. This was described as "the need to 
belong" by Baumeister and Leary (1995), when they theorized that this innate need is 
the fundamental motivation that drives most human emotions and behaviors. 
Changes in interpersonal relationships will greatly affect a person's emotions, 
causing copious positive affect during episodes of high belongingness, but on the 
other hand serious negative affect in case of belongingness breakdown or deprivation. 
These negative emotions during interpersonal hurtful events as well as the 
antecedents to these emotions are the focus of the present study. 
Unfortunately, relationships do go wrong; and when they do, it is often 
devastating, since such an essential human need of belonging is threatened. One kind 
of relationship breakdown involves "hurtful events", in which people cognitively 
appraise that the other party does not value their relationship as much as desired, 
resulting in as assessment of relational devaluation as described by Leary and others 
(Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998). As consequences of perceived 
relational devaluation, relationships between the victim and the perpetrator, as well 
as the victim's own well-being, are often weakened. In their study, for example, 
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Leary et al. (1998)'s participants indicated that, after being hurt, their self-esteem or 
self-confidence was lowered, and their feelings were strong or painfully negative. 
Once they were hurt, people found it difficult to trust not only the person who hurt 
them, but also other people (Leary & Springer, 2001). Being hurt could thus put 
people at risk of being at deficit not only in maintaining old relationships, but also in 
building new ones, causing deprivation in our fundamental, innate need to belong. 
When this hurt is sustained, it could farther cause maladaptive behaviors, such as 
violence towards the harm-doer or self-destructive behaviors. Anecdotal evidence, 
such as that mentioned in Levy, Ayduk, and Downey (2001), show that people would 
behave tragically and destructively - shooting classmates and teachers who have 
rejected him; murdering one's girlfriend out of jealousy; and even committing 
suicide — because of feelings of interpersonal hurt and rejection. 
Emotional Responses to Harmful Events as being Functional 
To prevent interpersonal hurt from leading to such extreme maladaptive 
behaviors, we need systems to build, monitor, and maintain our relational bonds. 
Emotions, functioning as alarm signals in our "sociometer", which monitors the cues 
from our social environment that are relevant to the degree to which others value our 
relationships (Leary & Downs, 1995). According to the sociometer theory, we are 
alerted of the possibility of threat to our social acceptance and thus our well-being by 
3 
our emotional responses to the environment (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary et al., 
1998). We are then motivated to take remedial actions and minimize the likelihood of 
social exclusion by others (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary et al., 1998). Along the 
lines of sociometer theory, Beck (1999) also reasoned that unpleasant emotions, 
although seemingly damaging, mobilize us to review the situation, take corrective 
action and prevent future harm. Emotions therefore play a crucial signaling function 
in preventing devastative destruction to our relationships, and eventually to ourselves. 
Understanding how these emotional responses result from cognitive processes during 
harmful events, as well as how these emotions would motivate a person's 
corresponding behaviors, is thus particularly important. The present study will focus 
on the former dimension - to investigate how cognitive appraisals would mediate the 
relationship between the perception of an emotional harmful event and different 
emotional responses. 
The Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Emotions 
Past research shows that a wide range of emotions can be experienced 
during interpersonal harmful events. Sadness, anxiety, loneliness, hopelessness, 
depression, jealousy, irritation, anger, etc. (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Jones, 
Moore, Schratter & Negel, 2001; Kelly, 2001; Leary, 1990; Leary et al., 1998; 
Pearson, Kelly, & Ryan, 1998) are consistently listed as affective and emotional 
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responses to being hurt. Yet, despite the immense work on studying emotions, 
understanding of when, under what conditions, and in whom different emotions are 
likely experienced remains limited (Smith & Kirby, 2001). Structural and process 
models of appraisal, which demarcate relations between certain cognitions and 
experience of specific emotions, are needed (Smith & Kirby, 2001). 
The cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (e.g., Arnold, 1960; de Rivera, 
1977; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Lazarus, 1982; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Weiner, 1985), aims at finding out rules about how cognitive processes generate and 
influence emotional responses. It argues that a person comes to experience a certain 
emotional state by perceiving and evaluating features in their environment, and that 
these cognitions always occur prior to emotional experiences (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 
2000). During an emotionally harmful event, it is reasonable to expect that cognitive 
appraisals of the nature of the event (what), the harm-doer (who), the cause of the 
event (why) will be made. Different emotions would be experienced according to 
how the event is appraised along the dimensions discussed below. 
Responsibility and controllability. Responsibility attribution has been 
consistently found as one of the most important dimensions for distinguishing 
between negative emotions (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). It has been reliably 
found that anger is experienced when the other party was judged as responsible for, 
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accountable for, and able to control the negative event, while sadness, helplessness, 
and fear result from perceiving that the negative event was caused by aspects of self 
over which one can exercise no control (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1986; 
Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1982; Weiner, 1985). 
In short, anger is felt when we think another person is responsible; sadness is felt 
when we think we are helpless victims of the situation (Ellsworth & Smith, 1985). 
Justification (legitimacy). Roseman (1984) first proposed legitimacy as a 
dimension that represents an appraisal of whether an outcome was deserved or 
undeserved. However, few if any further studies on cognitive appraisals have 
included such a construct in predicting emotions. Later, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) 
also included "legitimacy" as one of their appraisal dimensions. However, they did 
not measure exactly the same construct as originally proposed by Roseman (1984), 
since they measured the perceived fairness of the outcome instead of the perception 
of whether the outcome was justified, or ought to have happened. Reasonably, it is 
possible that one would perceive that the event was unfair, but since he or she 
deserved to be treated that way, or since the other party had the right to treat him or 
her unfairly, the other party was justified. "Legitimacy" (or justification) should thus 
not be considered equivalent to "fairness". 
Previous research has not yet provided a clear answer to the question of 
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whether and how cognitive appraisals of justification would determine the 
experience of different emotions. It is hypothesized, however, that the more one feels 
that the harm is justified, the more the attribution of blame to the self instead of to 
the perpetrator. Emotions of sadness instead of anger should thus be experienced. On 
the contrary, the lower the cognitive appraisal of justification, the angrier one feels 
towards the harm-doer. 
Norm violation. Norms are shared ideas among group members about 
appropriate behaviors in the group (Trandis, 1994). When norms are violated, 
whether they are public rules of behaviors or understood interpersonal "contracts" 
among individuals, expectations are contradicted, and the person feels betrayed 
(Jones, Moore, Schratter, & Negel, 2001). The cognitive appraisal theory has also 
proposed “norm compatibility" as a cognitive appraisal dimension addressing 
whether or not the event is compatible with external standards such as social norms, 
moral rules, cultural conventions or expectations of others (Scherer, 1984, 1988). 
Results show that anger and disgust were experienced when the situation had low 
compatibility with external social norms (Scherer, 1988). 
Yet most previous studies on "norm violation" have focused on the 
provocation of hostile emotions such as anger (Averill, 1983; Sanford, 1994; Weiner, 
1995; Weiner, Amirkhan, Fokes, & Verette, 1987). The effects of perceived norm 
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violation on other emotions are much less investigated. It is reasonable to expect that 
the more one perceives that the harm-doer's action has violated the norm, the higher 
the intensities of any experienced emotions. 
Other Social Factors 
Cognitions are indeed important in influencing our emotional experience. 
But it is also important to recognize that emotion is not merely the product of 
cognitions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1985). Some social factors have also been found to 
affect our emotional experiences. 
Relationship closeness. To understand emotional responses, it is important 
to consider the relationship between the victim and the harm-doer in a harmful event. 
In fact, our emotion is always relative to the other person involved, and the 
belongingness between the two individuals is one of the crucial dimensions in 
determining emotional reactions (de Rivera, 1977). Although we are hurt even by 
people with whom we are barely acquainted (Leary et al., 1998; Leary & Springer, 
2001), the degree to which an individual feels hurt should be related to the nature of 
relationship between the individuals involved in a hurtful event. According to 
relational devaluation theory, a person is hurt more in a relationship they desire more 
approval, and people are more likely hurt by people with whom they have more 
intimate relationships (Leary et al, 1998; Leary & Springer, 2001). The closeness of 
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the relationship with the harm-doer should thus be positively related with the 
intensity of negative emotions experienced during an interpersonal harmful event. 
Gender. Evidence shows that males are generally more likely to respond 
with anger, while females are more likely to internalize the problem and withdraw 
after they are emotionally hurt (e.g., Kelly, 2001). However, as emotional responses 
depend on both parties involved, considering the gender of either only the victim or 
only that of the harm-doer is likely to be insufficient. Previous research showed that 
males harmed by other males responded differently than males harmed by other 
females, and males were more reluctant to show that they were hurt in front of other 
males (Felson, 1978; Leary et al., 1998). In fact, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
genders of the victim and the harm-doer should interact, influencing the type of 
emotion experienced as well as the intensity at which it is experienced. 
Culture. A culture's normative social order shapes the group's ways of 
feelings (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). The cultural framework, according to Markus 
and Kitayama (1994), includes the cultural group's sense of when, where, and how 
one feels what emotion. 
Until recently, cross-cultural studies on emotions have focused on the debate 
on whether emotions are cross-culturally universal or different, basing on evidence 
from studies such as those on human facial expressions (Ekman, 1972, 1973; Izard, 
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1971) (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992 for review). This controversial debate between 
cultural relativity and specificity, and cultural universality (Ekman, 1994; Mead, 
1975; Russell, 1994), has however overlooked the possibility that emotions can 
concurrently be cross-culturally similar in some aspects and different in others 
(Scherer, Mesquita, & Frijda, 1997). According to the componential view of emotion 
process (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony & Turner，1990; Scherer, 1984), it is 
important to consider emotion as a process consisting of various components, 
including antecedent event, emotional experience, appraisal, change in action 
readiness, behavior, change in cognitive functioning and beliefs, and regulatory 
processes. Thus, when considering the question of whether people in different 
cultures are similar or different in emotion, each of these components must be 
considered individually (Scherer et al, 1997). The following are some cross-cultural 
findings on two of the above components: antecedent events and appraisals. 
Culture and emotion antecedent events. Considering emotion antecedents, 
evidence shows that the same event elicits similar emotions in individuals in 
different cultures (Boucher & Brant, 1981; Brant & Boucher, 1985; Scherer, 
Summerfield, & Wallbott, 1983; Scherer, Wallbott & Summerfidd, 1986). In these 
studies, no culture-specific categories were found when participants from different 
cultures were asked to describe or recognize situations that caused then anger, 
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sadness, fear, or happiness, signifying universality in the elicitation of human 
emotion. 
Similar events would, however, elicit similar emotions in individuals in 
different cultures to different degrees. For example, while being harmed by another 
elicited both anger and sadness in both Dutch and Surinamese participants, Dutch 
respondents reported more sadness, while the Surinamese reported more anger 
(Mesquita, 2001). 
Culture and appraisals. Studies have found both similarities and differences 
in cognitive appraisals in relation to emotions. Considering universality, research 
shows that people in different cultures evaluate events along similar appraisal 
dimensions (Frijda, Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995; Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer & 
Wallbott, 1988; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988), and that similar appraisals are associated 
with the same emotions across cultures (e.g., Sherer, 1997). Yet differences in 
appraisal practices and propensities have also been consistently found. Mauro, Sato, 
and Tucker (1992), in line with others (Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer, & Wallbott, 
1988), reported that the use of the appraisal dimension of responsibility differed in 
samples across cultures, and that participants from the Unites States made more use 
of this dimension than participants from Japan. More recently, Scherer (1997) has 
also reported that participants in Africa tended to appraise events more in dimensions 
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of immorality and fairness. 
Considering emotional responses during harmful events, the need to belong, 
mentioned above as an innate desire of all human beings, should universally exist in 
all humans in all cultures (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). With evidence supporting the 
elicitation of similar emotions during similar antecedents, it is reasonable to expect 
that similar negative emotional responses to harmful events would be observed 
universally. The intensities of these emotions experienced could, however, vary 
across different cultures. 
On the other hand, in light of evidence on cross-cultural similarities and 
differences in cognitive appraisals, it is reasonable to deduce that cognitive appraisal 
should associate with emotional experiences in a similar way across cultures during 
interpersonal harmful events, while differences should be found in the tendencies to 
use certain appraisal dimensions in appraising a similar harmful event. Attempting to 
"unpackage" cultural difference to an individual level (Bond, 1998), the investigation 
of emotional responses to being harmed in relation to cognitive appraisals at the 
individual level among people in different cultures, can help us understand not only 
the cultural level differences in, for example, degrees of emotional experiences, but 
also the individual variables that contribute to such dissimilarity. 
The Present Study 
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The present study explores emotional responses to perceived harmful events, 
in relation to cognitive appraisals and social factors, in four cultures: Germany, Hong 
Kong, the United States of America, and Japan. It is hypothesized that cognitive 
appraisals of norm violation, responsibility and controllability of the harm-doer, as 
well as relationship closeness between the participant and the harm-doer, will 
positively predict the intensities of emotions experienced. On the other hand, 
justification for the harm-doer's action will positively predict emotions of sadness, 
and negatively predict emotions of anger and hostility. 
In order to explore how well a model with cognitive appraisals as a mediator 
between emotional harm and negative emotional experiences fits the data, structural 
equation analysis will be conducted. The model is presented in figure 1. Moreover, 
with the purpose of examining how well the model applies to each cultural group, 
structural equation modeling with multi-sample analyses will be used. Owing to the 
exploratory nature of the model, further modifications are expected after preliminary 
results of factor analyses and correlation analyses are obtained. It is expected that the 
model will generally fit in every cultural group. However, differences in intensities 
of experienced emotions and the tendencies to use certain cognitive appraisals are 
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Figure 1. First proposed model relating perceived emotional harm, cognitive 
appraisals and emotional responses. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Participants 
884 university students (327 males, 545 females and 12 unidentified) from 
four countries were recruited from introductory psychology classes in their 
universities. Participants took part in this study as a partial fulfillment of the course 
requirements. They were 221 Germans (37 males, 183 females, one unidentified), 
145 Hong Kong Chinese (58 males, 86 females, one unidentified), 208 Japanese (99 
males, 106 females, three unidentified), and 310 Americans (133 males, 170 females, 
seven unidentified). The respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity 
for their responses. 
Materials 
Participants were asked to recall an experience in which someone had 
harmed them. They were then asked to fill in a questionnaire with reference to this 
event. The questionnaire included questions about the perceived degree of emotional 
harm of the event (3 items), emotional responses (12 items), perceived norm 
violation (9 items), perceived justification for the harm-doer's action (3 items), 
perceived responsibility and controllability of the harm-doer (3 items), the gender of 
the victim, the gender of the harm-doer, and how close the participants were with the 
harm-doer (2 items) (see appendix). 
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The questionnaire was originally developed in English, and was translated 
into the native languages of the participants, which were German, Chinese, and 
Japanese, respectively. In each language, back-translation was performed by a 
different translator and the translated versions were compared to the original one. 
Changes were made whenever necessary to maximize the equivalence in meaning in 
every version. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Since the present study does not attempt to investigate reactions to physical 
harm, which would likely involve quite different psychological processes, responses 
were discarded whenever physical harm was reported, resulting in a sample of 601 
participants (208 males; 393 females) — 160 Germans, 118 Hong Kong Chinese, 176 
Japanese, and 148 Americans. 
Factor Analyses & Reliabilities 
To ensure cultural equivalence in the meaning of the constructs, factor 
analyses were conducted for each construct in each cultural group separately. 
Varimax rotation was used, and only items that loaded on the same factor in all four 
cultures were included in further analyses. Factor loadings of all the items in the four 
samples, together with the Cronbach alphas of the scales, are presented in table 1 and 
table 2, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Factor loadings on emotions and cognitive appraisals 
Items Factor loadings 
Germany ；二 Japan USA 
Sadness .47 .64 .59 .59 
Fear .68 .74 .75 .74 
Depressive emotions Anxiety .78 .79 .77 .68 
Ashamed ^ 69 .71 
Anger .91 .88 .89 .83 
Hostile emotions Annoyance -97 .91 .93 .89 
Irritation ^ ： 9 3 .91 -81 .91 
„ ... , The person was responsible for harming me .49 .66 .57 .11 
o S r b i U w ^ t h e The person could have avoided harming you .85 .82 .85 .91 
con ro a doer If the person had wanted to (s)he could have 87 85 88 .85 
chosen not to harm you 
How well did you know the person who 92 95 93 
Relationship Closeness ^ h a t was your relationship with the person 92 91 95 93 
who harmed you? 
The person was justified in what (s)he did .86 .84 .75 .82 
Justification for You deserved what the person did to you .70 .75 .84 .67 
harm-doer's action The person had a right to do what (s)he did to 89 -73 34 34 
you 
The person's actions violated the rules of 67 62 52 .68 
normal social conduct 
The person acted in a way that someone in ^^ 68 83 .83 
his/her position should not act 
Norm Violation Given our relationship, the person' acted in a .74 .71 .86 .87 
way that was improper 
The person lacked consideration for my 乃 85 67 .80 
feelings 
The person lacked consideration for my 74 77 
situation 
Table 2 
Means, standard deviations, and reliability coefficients of scales 
Mean (SD) Reliability(Cronbach alpha) 
Responsibility and Germany 5.79 (1.19) " 5 
controllability of the harm-doer Hong Kong 5.15 (1.20) .71 
Japan 5.72 (1.23) .78 
^ 5.84 (1.43) .83 
Justification for harm-doer's Germany 2.31 (1.39) .76 
action Hong Kong 3.05 (1.40) .67 
Japan 1.93 (1.16) .74 
1.90 (1.22) -68 
Norm violation Germany 5.26 (1.24) .77 
Hong Kong 4.18 (1.27) .79 
Japan 5.30 (1.27) .78 
USA 5.21 (1.61) -85 
Relationship closeness Germany 4.71 (1.06) .83 
Hong Kong 4.50 (0.97) .79 
Japan 3.02 (1.73) .90 
USA 4.80 (1.11) .84 
Depressive emotions Germany 3.65 (1.14) .61 
Hong Kong 4.03 (1.27) .75 
Japan 3.13 (1.45) .72 
USA 4.21 (1.36) .68 
Hostile emotions Germany 5.68 (1.47) .93 
Hong Kong 3.97 (1.62) .89 
Japan 6.01 (1.24) .86 
USA 6.00 (1.35) ^ 
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Recalled emotional responses. Factor analyses of 12 recalled emotional 
responses resulted in two orthogonal factors in all four samples. Items that loaded 
(> .40) on the first factor included items of sadness, fear, anxiety, and shame; and 
those that loaded on the second factor included anger, irritation and annoyance. They 
were labeled as "depressive emotions" and "hostile emotions”，respectively. 
Perceived norm violation. In a single factor solution, three items were 
removed, as the factor loadings were smaller than .40 in at least one of the four 
cultural groups. Six items remained: "The person's actions violated the rules of 
normal social conduct", "The person acted in a way that someone in his/her position 
should not act", “Given our relationship, the person acted in a way that was 
improper", "The person lacked consideration for my feelings", "The person lacked 
consideration for my situation", and "The person lacked considerations for my safety 
and health". The item “The person lacked considerations for my safety and health" 
was also deleted since the deletion increases the Cronbach alphas significantly in all 
of the four samples, resulting finally in a single factor of five items. 
Responsibility and controllability of the harm-doer. In samples of all four 
countries, items that loaded on "Responsibility and controllability of the harm-doer" 
included "The person was responsible for harming me", "The person could have 
avoided harming me", and "If the person had wanted to (s)he could have chosen not 
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to harm me". 
Justification of the harm-doer 's action. Items measuring justification 
included "The person was justified in what (s)he did", “I deserved what the person 
did to me", and “The person had a right to do what (s)he did to me". 
Relationship closeness with the harm-doer. Items measuring relationship 
closeness were “How well did you know the person who harmed you?", and "What 
was your relationship with the person who harmed you?". In the second question, 
participants were to choose among different kinds of relationships, which ranged 
from close relationships (wife/ husband; close friend, etc.) to more distant ones (a 
stranger). 
Correlations 
Cognitive appraisals, social factors, and emotions. Average scores of items 
in each cognitive appraisal and social factor were correlated with those of the two 
factors of emotion. In general, norm violation and responsibility and controllability 
were positively correlated with hostile emotions, while justification was negatively 
correlated with hostile emotions, in every cultural group. The correlation matrices of 
the four cultural groups are presented in table 3. 
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Table 3 
Person correlation coefficients among variables 
Hostile Depress. Norm Responsibility Justification Relationship 
violation and closeness 
controllability 
of harm-doer 
Hostile emotions Germany **.34 **-.21 ^ 
Hong Kong 1.00 **.27 **.58 ！ 4^6 
Japan .10 **.29 1121 ！!：：22 ：04_ 
^ \m .19 "36 ！! ！ 
Depressive Germany ：^ 
emotions Hong Kong A6 **-28 . U 
Japan 1.00 * M 6 ^ ！119 ^ 
^ im MS M .10 *.23 
Norm violation Germany 1.00 ！IfO **-A6 
Hong Kong 1-00 **-46 
Japan 1.00 **-46 **-.40 -_U_ 
^ *_Z:64 **-.58 i04_ 
Responsibility and Germany 
controllability of Hong Kong 一 L ^ 
the harm-doer Japan L22 **--34 **--26 
USA **-.42 -.05 
Justification of the Germany 
harm-doer's action Hong Kong L25 
Japan • 
USA 1.00 ^ 
Relationship Germany 1 . � � 
closeness Hong Kong 1 加 
Japan L^i-
USA L ^ 
Germany: N = 145 
Hong Kong: N = 118 
Japan: N = 169 
USA: N = 142 
Note: ** p < .01 * p < .05 
ANOVAs on Intensities of Emotional Experiences among Cultural and Gender 
Groups 
A 2 X 2 X 4 between-subject analysis of variance was performed on the 
intensity of depressive emotions. Independent variables were the gender of the 
participant (male, female), the gender of the harm-doer (male, female), and cultural 
groups (Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, and the USA). 
Results are summarized in table 4, indicating a significant main effect of the 
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gender of the participant (F(i，564) 二 10.16; p < .005), as well as a significant main 
effect of cultural group (F(i，564) = 1 6 . 7 8 ; p < . 0 0 1 ) . The mean depressive emotions of 
male and female participants were 3.42 and 3.84 respectively. For cultural 
differences, participants in Hong Kong (mean = 4.02) and the United States (mean = 
4.07) reported the highest intensity of depressive emotions, followed by participants 
in Germany (mean 二 3.38), and participants in Japan (mean = 3.06). Further post-hoc 
Scheffe tests showed that significant group differences lay between every cultural 
group comparison (p < .05 in every comparison), except that between Hong Kong 
and USA groups. 
There was also a significant interaction between the gender of the 
participant and the gender of the harm-doer (F(i，564) = 9.11; p < .005). Descriptive 
statistics in table 5 show that females generally report higher intensities of depressive 
emotions than males. However, when the harm-doer was a female, both males and 
females reported statistically the same level of depressive emotions. Males being 
harmed by another male, reported the lowest intensity of depressive emotions. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of variance on depressive emotions 
Source of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F E 
Gender of participant 16.69 1 16.69 10.16 .002 
Gender of harm-doer 1.04 1 1.04 .63 .427 
Cultural Group 82.68 3 27.56 16.78 <.001 
Gender of participant x Gender of 
harm-doer 14.96 1 14.96 9.11 .003 
Gender of the participant x Cultural 
Group 2.80 3 .93 .57 .64 
Gender of the harm-doer x Cultural 
Group 5.37 3 1.79 1.09 .353 
Gender of the participant x Gender of 
the harm-doer x Cultural Group 5.93 3 1.98 1.20 .308 
Error 926.56 ^ L M 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of genders on depressive emotions 
Gender of participant Gender of harm-doer Mean Std. Deviation 
Male Male 3.17 .18 
Female ^ 
Female Male 3.99 .08 
Female ^ - R 
A similar analysis of variance was conducted on the intensity of hostile 
emotions. Results are presented in table 6, indicating a significant main effect of 
gender of participant (F(i, 565) 二 6.03; p < .05), a significant main effect of the gender 
of the harm-doer (F(i，565) = 9.83; p < .005), and a significant main effect of cultural 
group (F(3, 565) = 48.59; p < .001). The mean hostile emotions of male and female 
participants were 5.20 and 5.54 respectively; while those of male and female 
harm-doers were 5.59 and 5.15. For cultural group differences, participants in Hong 
Kong (mean == 4.00) reported significantly lower (p < .001 in post-hoc comparison) 
intensity of hostile emotions than participants in Germany (mean = 5.69), Japan 
(mean = 5.88), and the USA (mean = 5.92). 
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There was also a significant interaction effect between the gender of the 
participant and the gender of the harm-doer (F(i, 565) = 7.41; p < .01). Further 
analyzing the interaction effect: descriptive statistics in table 7 show that male 
participants reported higher intensities of hostile emotions than females when the 
harm-doer was also a male, but they reported lower hostile emotions than females 
when the harm-doer was a female. 
Table 6 
Analysis of variance on hostile emotions 
Source of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square ¥ 2 
Gender of p a r t i c i p a n t i ^ ^ ^ 
Gender of harm-doer 18.03 1 18.03 9.83 .002 
Cultural Group 267.35 3 89.12 48.59 <.001 
Gender of participant x Gender of 
harm-doer 13.60 1 13.60 7.41 .007 
Gender of the participant x Cultural 八， 
Group 5.28 3 1.76 •% -412 
of the h謹 - d o e r X Cultural ^^ ^^ 3 4.4O 2.40 .067 
Gender of the participant x Gender of 
the harm-doer x Cultural Group 4.50 3 1.50 .818 .484 
Error 1036.32 ^ L ^ 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for genders on hostile emotions 
Gender of participant Gender of harm-doer Mean Std. Deviation 
Male Male 5.61 .19 
Female Jl^ 
Female Male 5.57 .09 
Female ^ i l l 
Multiple Regression: Predicting Depressive Emotions 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to find out how 
cognitive variables of norm violation, responsibility and controllability of the 
harm-doer, justification, and social factors of relationship closeness and gender 
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predicted emotional experiences. 
Since correlations were observed among the predictor variables, tests for 
multicollinearity were conducted. The tolerance (tr) of the predictors were all larger 
than .10, while the variance inflation factors (VIFs) were all smaller than 10, both 
indexes indicating that the predictor variables were not linearly dependent. 
Appraisals of norm violation, responsibility and controllability of the 
harm-doer, justification for the harm-doer's action, relationship closeness with the 
harm-doer, together with dummy variables of gender, were entered in block one. 
Cultural groups were entered as dummy variables in block two, in order to find out 
whether culture group remains as a significant predictor variable after individual 
level variables of social and cognitive factors were already accounted for. 
A pooled sample analysis was conducted. ANOVA results are presented in 
table 8. Block one significantly explained 11% (adjusted R^ = .108; F=10.96; p 
< .001) of the variance of depressive emotions. A significant cultural group effect 
remains in block two (adjusted R^ change = .065; F change 二 15.72; p < .001). 
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Table 8 
ANOVA table of regression on depressive emotions 
Source of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Model 1 Regression 130.14 7 18.59 10.96 <.001 
Residual 961.99 567 1.70 
Total 1092.12 574 
Model 2 Regression 204.35 10 20.44 12.98 <.001 
Residual 887.77 564 1.57 
T o ^ 1092.12 51A 
Note: 
Model 1 predictors: appraised norm violation, appraised responsibility and controllability of 
the harm-doer, appraised justification for the harm-doer's action, 
relationship closeness, gender 
Model 2 predictors: appraised norm violation, appraised responsibility and controllability of 
the harm-doer, appraised justification for the harm-doer's action, 
relationship closeness, gender, cultural groups 
Focusing on predictor variables in block one, cognitive appraisal of norm 
violation (standardized .19; t = 3.56; p < .001) and justification of the 
harm-doer's action (/3 = .23; t = 4.93; p < .001) significantly predicted depressive 
emotions. Relationship closeness (/5= .18; t = 4.29; p < .001) also significantly 
predicted the intensity of depressive emotions. A dummy variable coding of gender 
indicating a female being harmed by a male, also significantly predicted depressive 
emotions (/5 = .23; t = 4.14; p < .001). Responsibility and controllability of the 
harm-doer was non-significant in predicting the outcome variable. Standardized beta 
weights are presented in table 9. 
Table 9 
Standardized beta weights of predictor variables on predicting depressive emotions 
Predictors Standardized Beta t £ 
Norm violation .19 3.56 <.001 
Justification .23 4.93 <.001 
Relationship closeness .18 4.29 <.001 
Responsibility and controllability ^ L i ^ ^ ^ 
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Multiple Regression: Predicting Hostile Emotions 
Variables for predicting hostile emotions were entered here the same way as 
described above in predicting depressive emotions. 
Block one significantly explained 27% of the variance of hostile emotions 
(adjusted R^ = .27; F = 31.50; p < .001). Block two, cultural groups, still significantly 
increased the prediction by 12% (adjusted R^ change = .12; F change 二 37.23; p 
< .001). ANOVA results are summarized in table 10. 
Table 10 
ANOVA table of regression on hostile emotions 
Source of variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Model 1 Regression 416.88 7 59.55 31.50 <.001 
Residual 1073.78 568 1.89 
T o ^ 1490.66 575 
Model 2 Regression 594.11 10 59.41 37.44 <.001 
Residual 896.55 565 1.59 
Total 1490.66 575 
Note: .. 
Model 1 predictors: appraised norm violation, appraised responsibility and controllability of 
the harm-doer, appraised justification for the harm-doer's action, 
relationship closeness, gender 
Model 2 predictors: appraised norm violation, appraised responsibility and controllability of 
the harm-doer, appraised justification for the harm-doer's action, 
relationship closeness, gender, cultural groups 
In block one, appraisals of norm violation (standardized ff = .30; t 二 6.27; p 
< .001), appraisal of justification of the harm-doer's action (standardized ；5= -.16; t 
=_3.82; p < .001), and appraisal of the harm-doer's responsibility and controllability 
(standardized = .14; t 二 3.27; p < .005), all significantly predicted hostile emotions. 
Dummy coding indicating a male harmed by a female (standardized 二 -. 15; t = 
-3.14; p < .005), also significantly predicted the outcome variable in a negative 
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direction. Standardized betas are presented in table 11. 
Table 11 
Standardized beta weights of predictor variables on predicting hostile emotions 
Predictors Standardized Beta t £ 
Norm violation .30 6.27 <.001 
Justification -.16 -3.82 <001 
Responsibility and 14 ^ 27 001 
controllability 
Relationship closeness ^ L29 .\91 
ANOVAs on Cognitive Appraisals of Norm Violation, Responsibility & Controllability, 
Justification, and Relationship Closeness among Cultural Groups 
In order to find out whether there are differences in levels of cognitive 
appraisals and relationship closeness among cultural groups, between-subjects 
ANOVAs were performed on appraisals of norm violation, appraisals of harm-doer's 
responsibility and controllability, appraisal of justification, and relationship closeness, 
respectively. Cultural groups (four levels) was entered as the independent variables. 
Norm violation. The appraisal of norm violation varied significantly with 
cultural groups, with F(3，565) = 15.13, p < .001. Participants in Hong Kong reported 
significantly lower (p < .001 in post-hoc comparison) level of appraisal of norm 
violation (mean = 4.18) than participants in the USA (mean = 5.13), participants in 
Japan (mean =5.16) and participants in Germany (mean = 5.36). 
Responsibility and controllability. The appraisal of responsibility and 
controllability also varied significantly with cultural groups, with F(3’563) = 5.80, p 
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<.005. 
Participants in Hong Kong reported the lowest level of responsibility 
appraisal (mean = 5.16), significantly lower than those reported by participants in 
Japan (mean = 5.64), participants in Germany (mean = 5.78) and participants in the 
USA (mean-5.81). 
Justification. The appraisal of justification also varied significantly with 
cultural groups, with F(3’563) = 17.10, p < .001. Participants in Hong Kong reported 
significantly higher levels of appraisal of justification (mean - 3.06) than participants 
in Germany (mean = 2.44), Japan (mean = 2.08), and the USA (mean = 1.94). 
Relationship closeness. Finally, the relationship closeness varied with 
cultural groups, with F(3，565) = 36.15, p < .001. Participants in Japan reported the 
lowest degree of relationship closeness (mean = 3.15): significantly lower than that 
reported by participants in Hong Kong (mean = 4.52), Germany (mean = 4.60), and 
the USA (mean = 4.64). 
Structural Equation Model 
Modifications were made to the proposed structural equation model 
according to the results above. The model is presented in figure 2. Focus was placed 
on how the cognitive appraisals mediated the relationship between perceived 
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Figure 2. Modified model with cognitive appraisals mediating relationships between 
perceived emotional harm and two factors of emotions. 
After an initial analysis of the model in each cultural group, it was found 
that the path from cognitive appraisals to depressive emotions was non-significant in 
three of the four cultural groups. Moreover, significant decreases in chi-square were 
found in every cultural group if a direct path was added from emotional harm to 
depressive emotions. Further modifications to the model were thus made (figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Modified model with cognitive appraisals mediating the relationship 
between perceived emotional harm and hostile emotions. 
The model fit indexes were acceptable in every cultural group. For the 
sample of participants in Germany, x ‘ = 92.70 (p < .05), GFI = .91, AGFI = .85, CFI 
=.92. For the Hong Kong sample, 乂 ^ = 115.25 (p < .05), GFI 二 .86, AGFI = .76, 
CFI = .86. For the sample in Japan, 乂 ‘ = 129.30 (p < .05), GFI = .89. AGFI = .82, 
CFI = .84. Finally, x ‘ 二 85.44 (p < .05), GFI = .91, AGFI = .86, CFI = .92 in the 
sample of participants in the USA. The standardized path coefficients are shown in 
figure 4. This outcome indicates that the proposed model generally fits the data in 
every cultural group. 
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Note: all path coefficients are significant. 
Figure 4. Standardized path coefficients of the structural equation model in the four 
cultural groups. 
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Structural Equation Model: Multisample Analysis 
A multisample analysis was conducted and the following fit indexes resulted: 
X 2 = 422.70 (p < .01), NNFI = .85, GFI = .89, AGFI = .83, CFI = .89, showing 
acceptable model fit with the data. 
Testing for equivalence in factor loadings. After constraints of equal factor 
loadings among the four cultural groups, % ^ = 440.79 (Ax^ = 18.1, Adf = 21; p 
> .05), indicating that the factor loadings in the four cultural groups are statistically 
equivalent. Fit indexes after constraints in factor loadings are: NNFI = .87, GFI = .89, 
AGFI 二 .84, CFI = .89. This outcome indicates that factor loadings are sufficiently 
equivalent among the four cultural groups. 
Testing for equivalence in factor structure. Constraining the factor structure, 
二 468.24 (Ax^ = 27.44, Adf = 9; p > .001). The factor structure presented in 
figure 4 can thus be considered equivalent in all four cultural groups. The fit indexes 
are: NNFI 二 .87, GFI = .88, AGFI = .84，CFI = .88, indicating acceptable universality 
of factor structure in all cultural groups. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
In general, the present findings support a universal model of responses to 
being harmed, with norm violation, responsibility attribution, and justification as 
cognitive appraisals, mediating the relationship between perceived emotional harm 
and hostile emotions. While norm violation, responsibility attribution and negative 
justification significantly predict hostile emotions, justification, norm violation, and 
relationship closeness with the harm-doer predict depressive emotions. Cultural 
differences in the intensities of emotions experienced were found. 
A Two Factor Model of Emotions 
Results show that the various emotions to being harmed can in fact be 
categorized by using a two factor solution, with depressive emotions (sadness, fear, 
anxiety, and shame) and hostile emotions (anger, irritation, and annoyance) being the 
two orthogonal factors, in all four cultural groups. In fact, although most previous 
studies have listed a wide range of different kinds of emotional responses to being 
harmed, anger (or hostility) and sadness (or depression) have often been seen as the 
two most typical but opposite emotional reactions to frustration in both clinical (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Becker & Leisiak, 1977; Harris & Howard, 1987; Shoemaker, Erickson 
& Finch, 1986) and nonclinical (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Karasawa, 2003; 
Wickless & Kirsch, 1988) studies. Smith and Ellsworth (1985), studying patterns of 
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cognitive appraisal in emotion, also noted that sadness and anger were the two 
opposite, most unpleasant, emotions. Therefore instead of linguistically designating a 
wide range of emotions, results suggests that depressive emotions and hostile 
emotions can be understood as underlying to various kinds of emotions, and that 
during a harmful event a person would experience both sadness (depression), as well 
as anger, with the strength of each emotional complex determined by the social and 
personal factors discussed below. 
Cognitive Appraisals and Relationship Closeness in Predicting Emotions 
Current findings support the conclusion that how a person cognitively 
appraises a harmful event along the dimensions of norm violation, responsibility and 
controllability of the harm-doer, and justification for the harm-doer's action, and the 
relationship between the victim and the harm-doer, significantly affect the person's 
emotions. Particularly in predicting hostile emotions, each of the three cognitive 
appraisals does by itself significantly, separately, add to the explanation of the 
explained variance in hostile emotions. This set of findings implies that the harmful 
interpersonal event is appraised along each of these dimensions before a person 
finally “decides，，whether he or she experiences hostile emotions. Instead of simply 
focusing on the dimension of responsibility attribution and overlooking the effect of 
justification, as in many previous studies on aggression and hostile emotions, our 
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findings encourage future studies to consider a full range of cognitive dimensions in 
mapping aggression and hostile emotions, with each of these features of cognitive 
appraisal adding to the resulting hostility experienced. 
As for depressive emotions, appraisal of justification for the harm-doer's 
action significantly predicted an increase in the target's sadness. That is, the more 
one judged that he or she deserved to be harmed, the more depressed he or she felt. 
Since self-blame is a major cognitive component in depression (Gilbert & Miles, 
1999), it is reasonable that if the victim feels that he or she deserves being harmed, 
he or she would become more depressed instead of hostile. 
On the other hand, while it has been consistently found that norm violation 
is related with anger and aggression, current findings show that it also relates with 
depressive emotions. It was also found that relationship closeness with the harm-doer 
predicts the intensity of depressive emotions experienced, but not to the intensity of 
hostile emotions, implying that depressive emotions arising from a harmful event, 
compared to hostile emotions, are more dependent on the relationship with the 
harm-doer. 
Moreover, while responsibility attribution does affect the intensity of hostile 
emotions during harmful events, results show that this appraisal is irrelevant in 
predicting depressive emotions. That is, the extent to which one finds the harm-doer 
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responsible and are able to control his or her action does little to affect whether or not 
one becomes depressed. Even when the harm-doer is not held accountable for 
causing the harm, the victim can still become depressed. 
Relative Significance of Cognitive Appraisals in Predicting Depressive and Hostile 
Emotions 
One intriguing finding in this study relates to the relative significance of 
cognitive appraisals as a mediating factor between the relationship of perceived harm 
and emotional experience. As indicated in both the regression analyses and the 
structural equation models, the cognitive appraisals under the present study are much 
more important in predicting hostile emotions than in predicting depressive emotions. 
As shown by the structural equation models, model fitness increased significantly in 
all cultural groups when the path linking cognitive appraisals to depressive emotions 
was released, and when a direct path leading perceived emotional harm to depressive 
emotions was added. 
Although the cognitive appraisal theory maintains that cognitive appraisals 
always precede emotions, it does little to state the relative significance of cognitive 
appraisals in predicting different kinds of emotions. This study shows that, at least 
for the three dimensions of cognitive appraisals under consideration, cognitive 
appraisal is relatively less important in determining whether we feel sad or not. In 
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fact, it shows that we would be more likely to immediately feel sad once a harmful 
event is perceived, despite how we evaluate the norm violation, responsibility, and 
controllability of the harm-doer. Anger or hostile emotions, in contrast, are rather 
imperatively determined by cognitive appraisals of how much norm violation is 
perceived, whether the harm-doer was responsible and under control, and whether 
the harm-doer's action was justified. 
Gender Differences 
Gender effects are complex. Instead of maintaining that males would always 
become angrier, or that females would generally become sadder during harmful 
events, we argued that genders of both the victim and the harm-doer must be 
considered together. Present results verified this view: females feel more depressed 
than males, only when the harm-doer was a male; males are less depressed when the 
harm-doer was also a male. This result was culture-general. For hostile emotions, 
while we often tend to typecast males as more hostile than females, our results show 
that ignoring the gender of the other party is over simplistic — males only felt more 
hostile than females when they were harmed by another male; in fact they felt less 
hostile than females when the harm-doer was a female. We are socialized to react 
differently according to the other party's gender, and the present study shows that 
these reaction tendencies are similar across all four cultural groups. 
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Cultural Differences: Intensities of Experienced Emotions 
The mean intensities of experienced emotions, including depressive 
emotions and hostile emotions, were found to be different among cultural groups. 
While people in Hong Kong and the USA reported significantly higher levels of 
depressive emotions, participants in Hong Kong reported the lowest level of hostile 
emotions. On the other hand, the Japanese reported higher level of hostile emotions, 
statistically equivalent to that of the Americans and Germans. 
A reasonable question after knowing these results is to ask why there are 
such cultural differences. Instead of merely speculating about reasons for cultural 
differences using renowned cultural level dimensions such as 
individualism-collectivism, power distance, etc., we attempted to elucidate these 
cultural level differences in intensities of emotions to harmful events at an individual 
level of cognitive and social variables. 
Cultural Differences: Evaluation of the Event using Cognitive Appraisals 
Why do people in different cultural groups report different levels of 
depressive emotions and hostile emotions? As illustrated below, this could be at least 
partially related to how people in different cultures tend to cognitively evaluate 
harmful events with different levels of norm violation, responsibility attribution, and 
justification. 
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It was found that participants in Hong Kong evaluated harmful events as 
least norm violating, attributed least responsibility and controllability towards the 
harm-doers, and found the harm-doers' actions most justified. Since it was also found 
that these cognitive appraisals all significantly predicted hostile emotions, it is 
reasonable to deduce that one reason for the lower level of hostile emotions in Hong 
Kong was because of these cognitive appraisal tendencies. Using the same rationale, 
we find that the Japanese and the Americans, on the contrary, tended to evaluate a 
harmful event as more norm violating, attributed more responsibility and 
controllability towards the harm-doer, and found less justification for the harm-doer's 
action, explicating why they reported the higher level of hostile emotions. Although 
this study does not enable us to answer why the Hong Kongese and the Japanese 
make these different strengths of appraisals, these results indicate which constructs 
need to be examined to determine the answer. 
Explanations for cultural group differences in depressive emotions was less 
comprehensive in the present study, as the variables under consideration have only 
explained about 11 percent of the variance of depressive emotions. Yet since 
justification negatively correlates with and predicts depressive emotions, and 
participants in Hong Kong were found to report the highest level of justification, the 
tendency to justify the harm-doer's action could be one of the reasons for cultural 
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differences in depressive emotions. 
Culture: Universality 
This study has established a universal model of emotional responses to 
being harmed, presented in figure 4. An analysis using multi-sample structural 
equation model did not only show that the factor loadings of cognitive appraisals and 
emotions were cross-culturally equivalent, but it also indicated that the factor 
structure was the same in every cultural group. This provides strong support for 
universality in the general process of emotional experience in response to harm, 
consistent also with previous views on cross-cultural similarities in linkages between 
cognitive appraisals and emotions (Frijda, Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995; Matsumoto, 
Kudoh, Scherer & Wallbott, 1988; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988, Sherer, 1997). 
Concluding on cross-cultural universalities and specificities, the present study 
supports Scherer et al.'s (1997) position that cultures cannot be talked about as 
simply similar or different. Human beings are broadly similar. Emotional responses 
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to being harmed are thus generally universal. While people in every culture would 
tend to immediately feel depressed during a harmful event, we all tend to feel angry 
through cognitive evaluations of the event, the harm doer's action, his or her 
responsibility, and also the harm-doer's gender. Yet cultural specificities can 
concurrently exist — people in different cultures would appraise an emotionally 
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harmful event differently along dimensions of the harm-doer's responsibility and 
controllability, norm violation, and justification; and people in different culture 
would thus experience different intensities of emotions during harmful events. 
The Japanese: High Intensity of Hostile Emotions 
In finding significant cultural differences in intensities of emotions in 
response to harm, the Japanese were found to experience higher levels of hostile 
emotions. This is particularly interesting, as an Asian culture like the Japanese that 
has typically been seen as collectivistic is found to be more similar to western 
cultures like the Americans. In fact, this also seems to contradict a study by Akiyama 
(1992), who found that the Japanese recalled both positive and negative affects at a 
lower intensity than the Americans, and conjectured that the Japanese were not 
socialized to monitor, elaborate, or express their emotions, and thus these emotions 
were less likely recalled. 
In fact, recent research has shed light on the possibility that past 
cross-cultural investigations have been over-generalized if not slack in defining 
individualism and collectivism, and that many have been too ready to attribute any 
cross-cultural differences to Western individualism versus East Asian collectivism 
processes (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In line with such a view, 
we advocate and have attempted instead to find individual level cognitive appraisal 
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processes that could explain cultural level differences. In our findings, the typical 
collectivistic Japanese are in ways more similar to the Americans and the Germans 
instead of with Hong Kong Chinese. 
Future Directions 
It would be interesting to ask a further question of why people in different 
cultures would have different tendencies to appraise harmful events along different 
cognitive dimensions. It is possible that, for example, a reason for participants to 
attribute higher norm violation to harmful events was due to the fact that harmful 
events are less likely to occur in Japan. This could also explain the lower level of 
justification for the harm-doer's action as appraised by the Japanese - harming others 
is seen as much less justified, as the social contract in the culture agrees strongly that 
no one should harm another. Harmful events would thus be less frequent in Japan. By 
forcing our respondents to select an event where they were harmed, we are 
examining emotional responses to a more normatively proscribed event, and one 
therefore to which there will be greater anger. These are, yet, mere speculations, as 
well as directions for future research. 
On the other hand, this study has shown that there are gender differences in 
emotional responses to harm. It also illustrated that we tend to react differently to 
harm-doers of different genders. The present study did not aim at explaining why 
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these differences exist, yet finding out why and how we are socialized to experience 
different emotions when we are harmed by people of different genders would be an 
intriguing area for future studies on gender. 
As mentioned at the beginning, it is important to understand how emotions 
would motivate a person's corresponding behaviors, in order to understand more 
about how emotions play an essential role in signaling interpersonal devaluation, and 
thus preventing relationship destruction. Further studies should thus tap on the issue 
of consequent behaviors resulted from different emotions caused by interpersonal 
harm. 
Limitations 
This "unpackaging" of cultural differences is not yet complete, as indicated 
by the remaining variance of emotions explained by culture in the multiple 
regression after emotional responses had been explained by cognitive appraisals and 
social factors. 
One major limitation of the present study is the use of retrospective 
self-reports. Without online measurements of emotional responses, the present study 
is in fact measuring recalled emotions. It is thus unclear whether the process of 
causation worked during the event itself in the way proposed. The reported cognitive 
appraisals could in fact be appraisals during the recollection, instead of those that 
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occurred during the event. These reports would also be greatly affected by the final 
outcome of the event, which was not assessed in this study. A person would, for 
example, likely report more intense negative appraisals and emotions if the 
relationship became worse after the harmful event, in contrast with relationships in 
which reconciliation has been reached. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the range of variables was limited to 
several cognitive appraisals and social factors of closeness of relationships and 
gender. In explaining emotional responses to being harmed, it is obvious that many 
other factors, such as personality traits like neuroticism, the social environment and 
social support, would also significantly affect emotions. The small percentage of 
variance of depressive emotions explained by cognitive appraisals clearly suggests 
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Think about a specific time within the last two years someone has harmed 
you. The harm that occurred could have been physical harm or emotional harm (such 
as insulting you or betraying you). When you have thought of an episode, please 
answer the following questions concerning that incident. Your responses will remain 
completely anonymous and confidential. Please do not use your name or any other 
person's name in your responses. 
Please take your time and try to answer the questions as thoroughly as possible. 
Parti 
Your Gender (please circle) l=Male 2=Female 
1. How were you physically harmed? Did the person (choose the most severe action 
done to you) 
a) push, shove, or grab you 
b) slap, punch, or kick you 
c) use weapon 
d) physically harm you in some other way 
e) I was not physically harmed 
2. The person who harmed you was a: l=Male 2=Female 
3. How well did you know the person who harmed you? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very well 
4. What was your relationship with the person who harmed you? 
a. wife/ husband 
b. boyfriend/ girlfriend 
c. mother/ father 
d. sister/ brother 
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e. other family member 
f. close friend 
g. someone from work or school 
h. someone from your neighborhood 
i. person was a stranger 
Part 2 
1. How sad were you because of what happened? 
Not sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very sad 
2. How afraid were you because of what happened? 
Not afraid 1 2 3 45 67 Very afraid 
3. How much rage were you because of what happened? 
No rage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong rage 
4. How much anxiety did you feel during the incident? 
No anxiety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong anxiety 
5. How humiliated were you by the incident? 
Not humiliated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very humiliated 
6. How disgraced were you by the incident? 
Not disgraced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very disgraced 
7. How embarrassed were you by the incident? 
Not embarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very embarrassed 
8. How ashamed were you by the incident? 
Not ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very ashamed 
9. How much did you resent the other person for harming you? 
No resentment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong resentment 
10. How irritated were you at the other person? 
53 
Not irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong irritation 
11. How annoyed were you at the other person? 
Not annoyed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very annoyed 
12. How angry were you at the other person? 
Not angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very angry 
13. The person's actions violated the law 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
14. The person's actions violated the rules of normal social conduct 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
15. How much would your friends and family approve of what the person did to you? 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
16. The person acted in a way that someone in his/her position should not act. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
17. Given our relationship, the person acted in a way that was improper. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
18. The person lacked considerations for my safety and health. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
19. The person lacked considerations for my feelings. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
20. The person lacked considerations for my situation. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
21. The person's actions disrupted social order or social harmony. 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
22. The person was responsible for harming me. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
23. The person could have avoided harming me. 
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Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
24. If the person had wanted to (s)he could have chosen not to harm me. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
25. The person was justified in what (s)he did. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
26.1 deserved what the person did to me. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
27. The person had a right to do what (s)he did to me". 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
28. You were emotionally injured in the incident 
Definitely not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely 
29. How would you rate the amount of emotional harm which occurred to you in the 
incident? 
No harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very great harm 
30. How severe was the emotional harm you suffered? 
No harm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very severe harm 
Note: The original questionnaire contained more items. Only questions related to the 
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